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State Regulatory Responses to the
Prescription Opioid Crisis:
Too Much to Bear?
Lars Noah*
ABSTRACT
In order to prevent further overuse of prescription opioids,
states have adopted a variety of strategies.  This article summa-
rizes the growing use of prescription drug monitoring programs,
crackdowns on “pill mills,” prohibitions on the use of particularly
hazardous opioids, limitations on the duration and dosage of pre-
scribed opioids, excise taxes, physician education and patient dis-
closure requirements, public awareness campaigns, and drug
take-back programs.  Although occasionally challenged on con-
stitutional grounds, including claims of federal preemption under
the Supremacy Clause, discrimination against out-of-state busi-
nesses under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and inter-
ference with rights of commercial free speech, this article
evaluates the possibility that patients might have substantive due
process objections against the more aggressive initiatives for un-
duly burdening a fundamental right of access to narcotic
analgesics.  In particular, if these regulatory efforts put substan-
tial obstacles in the way of terminally-ill patients seeking pallia-
tive care, then states would face a difficult burden of justification.
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Karl Marx said “Religion is the opiate of the masses.”
I did masses of opiates religiously.
—Carrie Fisher*
INTRODUCTION
In a recent scholarly article, I criticized the federal response to
the prescription opioid crisis as tepid and tardy.1  Although hardly
uniform, states have reacted more aggressively to the problem.2  In-
deed, several observers have complained that some of the latest
state and local initiatives represent overreactions, which may de-
* See Kate Muir, It’s Carrie Fisher’s Lacerating Wit I’ll Miss; As a Wisecracking
Writer, She Earns Her Place Among a Heavenly Hollywood Sisterhood, TIMES
(London), Dec. 30, 2016, Features at 9 (highlighting this quip from Ms. Fisher’s
1987 novel, Postcards from the Edge); cf. Catherine Rampell, Opinion, Was Barr’s
Religion Speech a Cry for Help?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2019, at A27 (“Militant
secularism, [the U.S. Attorney General] said, is to blame for the country’s greatest
ills, including drug use . . . .”).
1. See Lars Noah, Federal Regulatory Responses to the Prescription Opioid
Crisis: Too Little, Too Late?, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 757; see also Mariano-Florentino
Cue´llar & Keith N. Humphreys, The Political Economy of the Opioid Epidemic, 38
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2020); William K. Hubbard, Editorial, Get-
ting Serious About Opioid Regulation, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 309, 309 (2020)
(“Actions at the federal level to combat the opioid epidemic have been un-
derwhelming.”); Abby Goodnough & Margot Sanger-Katz, Research Faults F.D.A.
on Opioid Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2019, at A13; Sabrina Tavernise, New
Standards for Painkillers Aim to Stem Overdose Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016,
at A1 (“The federal government has lagged the states in its response to the opioid
epidemic.”).
2. See Barry Meier & Sabrina Tavernise, States Push to Curb Painkiller
Overuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2016, at B1 (“[T]he pace of activity in states has
grown so intense that experts are having difficulty keeping track.  Currently, there
are about 375 proposals in state legislatures that would regulate pain clinics and
several aspects of prescribing painkillers . . . .”); see also infra Part I (surveying
some of these efforts).
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prive legitimate patients of access to drugs that they desperately
need.3
This article attempts to assess such complaints and the merits
of constitutional objections to restrictive state laws.4  It focuses on
measures designed to prevent opioid addiction and diversion,5 leav-
ing to others an assessment of equally important state and local ef-
forts to help those addicted to opioids, whether by rescuing
overdose victims or treating persons with substance use disorders.6
Part I of this article offers a snapshot of the different mechanisms
3. See, e.g., George Comerci et al., Controlling the Swing of the Opioid Pendu-
lum, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 692 (2018) (“We fear that an injudicious approach
involving blanket refusals to prescribe opioids and adoption of unreasonable pre-
scribing and dispensing regulations will increase patient suffering.”); Kelly K.
Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchro-
nizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 45–46, 55–68 (2016); id. at 73 (criticizing “the typical use reduc-
tion approach embraced by many in the public health and policy community”);
Susan A. Glod, The Other Victims of the Opioid Epidemic, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2101, 2102 (2017) (bemoaning the “all-or-nothing approach to pain management
under which the pendulum has swung from one unsustainable end of the spectrum
to the other in the past two decades”); Mark A. Rothstein, Editorial, The Opioid
Crisis and the Need for Compassion in Pain Management, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1253, 1254 (2017) (“Desperately ailing patients who legitimately need medical re-
lief from serious pain should not be the latest unintended victims of societal opioid
abuse.”); see also infra notes 62, 114–15 (noting more such objections).
4. For a broader treatment of the constitutional questions that arise when
states attempt to countermand federal judgments about the availability of thera-
peutic agents, see Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of
Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
5. A striking correlation exists between the supply of prescription opioids and
fatal overdoses. See Sari Horwitz et al., Deaths Soared As Pills Proliferated,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2019, at A1 (“The national death rate from opioids was 4.6
deaths per 100,000 residents.  But the counties that had the most pills distributed
per person experienced more than three times that rate on average.”).
6. See, e.g., Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids
for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 29–33 (2017) (discussing the widespread adoption of state laws
to make the overdose reversal agent naloxone more easily available and immunize
those who call for assistance); Andrew M. Parker et al., State Responses to the
Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367, 371–74 (2018).  Schemas favored by
some public health aficionados would instead treat these as different varieties of
“prevention.” See Melissa McPheeters & Mary K. Bratton, The Right Hammer for
the Right Nail: Public Health Tools in the Struggle Between Pain and Addiction, 48
U. MEM. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2018) (“Laws intended to affect initial prescriptions
and prescribing patterns are primary prevention.  Those laws . . . intended to sup-
port the needs of individuals and groups with substance use disorder, with the goal
of preventing further negative outcomes, can be classified as ‘tertiary [preven-
tion].’”); see also id. at 1303–05, 1353–55 (elaborating on this distinction, and sug-
gesting—along the dimension of available “levers” for pursuing these different
forms of prevention—that even interventions aimed at individual physician-patient
relationships might appropriately qualify as public health initiatives when viewed
in the aggregate).
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that states have adopted in trying to prevent the overuse and mis-
use of prescription opioids.  In a few cases, courts have resolved
constitutional challenges to these efforts, primarily framed in terms
of federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause and the dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine.  Part II of this article will con-
sider the viability of various substantive due process objections
under the Fourteenth Amendment, shifting the focus from the
rights asserted by sellers to the rights that users might invoke to the
extent that state governments have deprived patients of access to
needed pharmaceutical products.
I. SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE
State legislatures and regulatory officials have adopted a num-
ber of measures designed to prevent the overuse, misuse, and abuse
of prescription opioids.7  Although the sections that follow consider
these regulatory efforts in isolation from one another, it bears em-
phasis that some states have pursued multifaceted approaches,8
which increases the prospect of having some meaningful impact on
the problem but also complicates any efforts to tease apart the rela-
tive contributions of different constituent strategies.9  Conversely,
forcing prescribers to jump through numerous hoops may discour-
7. Except when focusing on particular state efforts, this article references cur-
rent compilations of these state laws whenever possible and without attempting to
confirm the accuracy of their characterizations.  The National Alliance for Model
State Drug Laws (NAMSDL), which Congress chartered in 1993, and the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) generally offered the most up-to-date
information.  For slightly older surveys of state laws related to the opioid crisis, see
Nat’l Governors Ass’n, State Reporting: NGA Compact to Fight Opioid Addiction
(July 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2PlmgVy [https://perma.cc/5AVF-ETLG]; and Sonder-
egger Research Ctr., State Laws and Other Regulatory Policies Related to Pain
Care (Dec. 31, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Pm0Yab [https://perma.cc/S6L7-DG8J].
8. See, e.g., McPheeters & Bratton, supra note 6, at 1321–25, 1327–29,
1335–37, 1342, 1345–46, 1349–53 (summarizing various steps recently taken in Ten-
nessee); see also Parker et al., supra note 6, at 376 (“[S]everal states (including
Illinois, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Connecticut) created comprehensive
opioid plans which identify overarching goals and define processes for achieving
them.” (footnotes omitted)); id. (“States are coalescing around a number of com-
mon policy options . . . , but they are also engaged in the process of
experimentation.”).
9. See Deborah Dowell et al., Mandatory Provider Review and Pain Clinic
Laws Reduce the Amounts of Opioids Prescribed and Overdose Death Rates, 35
HEALTH AFF. 1876, 1881 (2016) (“[I]t is not possible to clearly determine whether
the combined implementation of the policies or mandated PDMP [prescription
drug monitoring program] review drove the observed changes, although pain clinic
laws alone appear to have a smaller, if any, effect on overdose deaths.”); Tamara
M. Haegerich et al., What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the Impact of State
Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 DRUG
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 34, 44 (2014) (“Multiple efforts operating within states
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age even entirely appropriate uses of opioids and work to the detri-
ment of patients.
A. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Sweep the Nation
Every state now has a prescription drug monitoring program
(PDMP), though variations exist in the scope and manner of use of
these databases.10  PDMPs allow prescribers and dispensers to dis-
cover whether particular patients previously have filled prescrip-
tions for controlled substances, perhaps after visiting multiple
providers (a.k.a. “doctor shopping”).11  In addition, law enforce-
ment officials can use the systems to identify suspicious patterns of
prescribing and dispensing by particular health care professionals
and facilities.12  A majority of states now require that providers
that occur in concert with legislation changes have limited the ability to draw
causal conclusions about individual state policy effectiveness.”).
10. See Corey S. Davis et al., Evolution and Convergence of State Laws Gov-
erning Controlled Substance Prescription Monitoring Programs, 1998–2011, 104
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1389, 1390–93 (2014) (documenting the central variations);
A. Travis Manasco et al., Characteristics of State Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs: A State-by-State Survey, 25 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY
847, 850 (2016) (“[T]here is considerable heterogeneity between state PDMPs in
characteristics such as reporting time, data sharing, provider identification, and
high-risk patient or prescriber reporting.”); Christine Vestal, Physicians Check Pa-
tients for Use of Addictive Drugs, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2018, at E4. See generally
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training & Technical Assistance Ctr., State
Profiles, https://bit.ly/39bwCz2 [https://perma.cc/2BRJ-3YUF] (last visited Feb. 25,
2020).
11. See Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Pub-
lic Health Laws, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1632 (2016) (“PDMPs are a popular, state-
level, legal mechanism that have gained the reputation of having incredible prom-
ise for addressing opioid misuse.”); id. at 1634–37, 1685–86 (elaborating); id. at
1672–76 (reviewing some of the literature on their effectiveness); McPheeters &
Bratton, supra note 6, at 1316–23 (discussing the central role played by Tennessee’s
PDMP in pursuing primary prevention of opioid misuse).
12. See Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1264–66 (10th Cir. 2017) (affirming the
dismissal of Fourth Amendment objections to warrantless searches of Utah’s
PDMP); Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1014, 1021–22 (Cal. 2017) (re-
jecting patient privacy objections asserted by a physician targeted for investigation
by the state’s board of medicine); see also Jennifer D. Oliva, Prescription Drug
Policing: The Right to Protected Health Information Privacy Pre- and Post-Carpen-
ter, 69 DUKE L. REV. 775, 833–53 (2020) (predicting that warrantless searches of
these databases by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) may fare
less well against Fourth Amendment objections in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2018 decision protecting cell-site location information held by wireless car-
riers); Devon T. Unger, Note, Minding Your Meds: Balancing the Needs for Patient
Privacy and Law Enforcement in Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 117 W.
VA. L. REV. 345, 349–50, 368, 381–83 (2014) (discussing law enforcement uses, and
concluding that “patients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their person-
ally identifiable PDMP data, and the Fourth Amendment requires that law en-
forcement obtain a warrant before accessing” it).
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check their PDMPs before supplying controlled substances to
patients.13
These databases suffer from well-known limitations.  For in-
stance, dispensers may do a poor job of filing reports, or agency
employees may fail to promptly upload the reports that they re-
ceive.14  Lack of coordination with adjacent states also means that
patients can cross borders to engage in doctor shopping.15  None-
theless, when properly implemented and made a prerequisite for
prescribing and dispensing, PDMPs plainly help to guard against
opioid misuse by patients.16  A frequently expressed concern about
this tool speculates, however, that the prospect of having usage
tracked will not simply guard against abuse but also may chill even
legitimate prescribing to the detriment of patients in need.17
13. See NAMSDL, Prescriber Mandated Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs (PDMP/PMPs)—Map (Jan. 2, 2019), https://bit.ly/2Pqyn3F [https://
perma.cc/57QJ-B5EQ] (counting forty states with such requirements); Vestal,
supra note 10, at E4 (reporting that these requirements began appearing in 2010
and now exist in 39 states); see also Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 313 JAMA 891, 892 (2015) (“[PDMP]
mandates are a proliferating policy tool.”); id. at 891 (“In Kentucky, Tennessee,
New York, and Ohio—early adopters of comprehensive use mandates—there were
substantial increases in queries and reductions in opioid prescribing following im-
plementation.”); id. (“Mandates face significant prescriber opposition across the
country.”).
14. See Manasco et al., supra note 10, at 849 (finding average lag times of one
week or more in twenty-eight states); Stephen W. Patrick et al., Implementation of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Associated with Reductions in Opioid-Re-
lated Death Rates, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1324, 1329–30 (2016) (finding that more fre-
quent (at least weekly) updating improved effectiveness); Jeanmarie Perrone &
Lewis S. Nelson, Medication Reconciliation for Controlled Substances—An “Ideal”
Prescription-Drug Monitoring Program, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2341, 2342 (2012)
(“[P]harmacy data entry is time-consuming, and data are uploaded to the prescrip-
tion database at variable intervals—from immediately or once daily to weekly or
monthly.  For a PDMP to be most valuable in clinical practice, it must be current,
which would require pharmacists to promptly upload information.”).
15. See Richard A. Deyo et al., Measures Such As Interstate Cooperation
Would Improve the Efficacy of Programs to Track Controlled Drug Prescriptions,
32 HEALTH AFF. 603, 609 (2013) (discussing efforts to link state PDMPs); Joanna
Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescrip-
tion Drug Reporting Program, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 94, 107–08 (2014).
16. See Ian Ayres & Amen Jalal, The Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs on U.S. Opioid Prescriptions, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 387, 389 (2018)
(“Our results indicate that PDMPs are not effective in reducing prescription rates
unless physicians are required to access the PDMPs prior to prescription.”); id. at
390 (reviewing previous studies of this question, and noting their limitations); id. at
397 (“PDMPs are only effective if they obligate doctors to check for patient history
on the PDMP prior to filling out a prescription.”); Thomas C. Buchmueller & Col-
leen Carey, The Effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on Opioid Utili-
zation in Medicare, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2018, at 77, 109 (same).
17. See Deyo et al., supra note 15, at 607 (“Some clinicians and patient advo-
cates believe that prescription monitoring programs have a chilling effect on opioid
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B. Shutting Down “Pill Mills” in the Sunshine State
In Florida, so-called pill mills had proliferated, attracting busi-
ness from opioid customers throughout the country.18  In 2009, the
state legislature began imposing physician ownership and registra-
tion requirements alongside various restrictions on the operation of
these pain-management clinics.19  At the same time, it ordered the
creation of a PDMP.20  Although neither the first nor the only state
to tackle pill mills,21 Florida’s efforts have garnered the most atten-
prescribing and adversely affect pain management.”); Haffajee et al., supra note
13, at 891–92 (“Although [PDMP use] mandates are not meant to deter opioid
prescribing per se, resistant clinicians may simply decline to prescribe opioids
. . . .”); Perrone & Nelson, supra note 14, at 2342 (“There are realistic concerns that
a PDMP is burdensome for prescribers and dispensers and may inappropriately
reduce the amount of opioid analgesic prescribed.”). But cf. Hallam M.
Gugelmann & Jeanmarie Perrone, Can Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Help Limit Opioid Abuse?, 306 JAMA 2258, 2258 (2011) (“[T]he targeted use of
drug monitoring programs by prescribers does not result in indiscriminately de-
creased administration of pain medications.”).
18. See Scott Higham et al., 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal
Data Unmasks the Epidemic, WASH. POST, July 17, 2019, at A1 (“During the past
two decades, Florida became ground zero for pill mills—pain management clinics
that served as fronts for corrupt doctors and drug dealers . . . , advertising their
products on billboards by interstate exit ramps.”).
19. See 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 198, §§ 3–4, repealed and replaced by 2010 Fla.
Laws ch. 211, §§ 3–11 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 458.3265, 459.0137,
465.0276); see also Lizette Alvarez, Florida Shutting “Pill Mill” Clinics: New Laws
Curb Illegal Sales of Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at A1.  Clinics operated
by specially trained physicians may apply for a certificate of exemption from these
rules. See FLA. STAT. § 458.3265(1)(a)(3)(h); see also State v. Crumbley, 247 So.
3d 666, 671–72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (remanding a vagueness challenge for
fact-finding in the prosecution of a physician and office manager operating an unli-
censed pain-management clinic).
20. See 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 198, § 1 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 893.055); see also Chris Delcher et al., Abrupt Decline in Oxycodone-Caused
Mortality After Implementation of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Pro-
gram, 150 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 63, 65 (2015) (finding a 25% drop in
overdose deaths associated with oxycodone within fourteen months of launch).
See generally Ashley Dutko, Note, Florida’s Fight Against Prescription Drug
Abuse: Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 34 NOVA L. REV. 739 (2010).
21. See Lainie Rutkow et al., Editorial, More States Should Regulate Pain
Management Clinics to Promote Public Health, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 240
(2017) (“[T]hus far only 11 states have enacted specific regulation of pain manage-
ment clinics.”).  For instance, Texas also had targeted pill mills. See 2009 Tex. Gen.
Laws ch. 775, § 1 (codified as amended at TEX. OCCUPATIONS CODE ch. 168) (re-
quiring certification of pain management clinics, physician ownership, and that
owners be on-site at least one-third of the time and review at least one-third of
patient records); Cindy Horswell, “Pill Mills” Skirt Law by Playing Name Game—
By Changing Monikers, They Avoid State Scrutiny, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2011,
at A1 (discussing implementation difficulties); see also McPheeters & Bratton,
supra note 6, at 1327–32 (discussing Tennessee’s crackdown on pill mills).
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tion.  Within a few years of passage, researchers documented that
these reforms had shown signs of success.22
A facility qualified as a pain-management clinic subject to the
requirements of the Florida statute if, among other things, it had
engaged in advertising to the public.23  Although constitutional ob-
jections to the advertising provision appeared to have genuine
merit under commercial speech doctrine,24 a federal district court
dismissed a facial challenge to the law.25  In doing so, it emphasized
that pain-management clinics remained free to advertise so long as
they satisfied the registration and other requirements,26 not realiz-
ing that one decade earlier the U.S. Supreme Court had invalidated
an act of Congress that operated in much the same fashion.27  Most
22. See Alene Kennedy-Hendricks et al., Opioid Overdose Deaths and Flor-
ida’s Crackdown on Pill Mills, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 291, 295–96 (2016); Lainie
Rutkow et al., Effect of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and Pill
Mill Laws on Opioid Prescribing and Use, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1642, 1643
(2015) (discussing earlier research on this question); id. at 1648
(“[I]mplementation of Florida’s PDMP and pill mill law was associated with mod-
est decreases in opioid use and prescribing among patients and providers with high
levels of opioid use at baseline relative to Georgia, a comparison state.”); Timothy
W. Martin & Arian Campo-Flores, New Front Opens in Florida Pill War—Crack-
down on Pain Clinics Selling Oxycodone Makes Headway, but Addicts Now Crowd
Pharmacies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2012, at A6 (“In 2010, 90 of the top 100 ox-
ycodone-purchasing physicians in the country were in Florida, but that number
dropped to 13 in 2011, according to [DEA] data.”); see also Tatyana Lyapustina et
al., Effect of a “Pill Mill” Law on Opioid Prescribing and Utilization: The Case of
Texas, 159 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 190, 195–96 (2016) (finding that the
Texas law worked); Rutkow et al., supra note 21, at 243 (concluding that pill mill
laws “fill an important gap with their unique targeting of high-risk prescribing en-
vironments while minimizing impact on legitimate users”).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 458.3265(1)(a)(1)(c)(I) (2019).
24. See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. Pub-
lic Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 89 n.234 (2011); id. at
67 (“[O]utright prohibitions designed to dampen demand (or to serve other collat-
eral purposes) [are] vulnerable to constitutional invalidation, while more limited
restrictions or disclosure requirements designed to guard against potentially mis-
leading promotional messages would seem to survive.”).
25. See P.R.A. v. Armstrong, No. 4:10cv414-RH/CAS, 2012 WL 13034006, at
*1–2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2012).
26. See id. at *2 (“The statutes do not prohibit the plaintiffs from advertising.
The statutes instead use advertising as a means of identifying pain-management
clinics that must register.”).
27. See Noah, supra note 24, at 51–65 (discussing Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)); id. at 54–57 (explaining that the challenged provision
“posed an unconstitutional conditions problem insofar as it had predicated the
availability of an exception to an existing legal requirement on the waiver of First
Amendment rights”); see also Lars Noah, Does the U.S. Constitution Constrain
State Products Liability Doctrine?, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 189, 210 (2019) (explaining
that a state law “impos[ing] special burdens on companies when they advertise—
whether or not the advertisements contained any misleading claims . . . —plainly
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other state pill mill laws do not use advertising as a trigger for their
various restrictions on the operation of these facilities.28
C. Trying to Ban a Hydrocodone Product in Massachusetts
In 2013, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ap-
proved a new drug application submitted by Zogenix, Inc. for an
extended-release hydrocodone product (Zohydro ER®) intended
for patients with chronic severe pain that failed to respond to alter-
native treatment.29  Less than six months later, the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts acted to prevent any sales of this drug,30 which
prompted the manufacturer to lodge various constitutional
objections.31
Within a month, a federal district court sided with Zogenix,
issuing a preliminary injunction against the Commonwealth.32
Judge Rya Zobel concluded that the congressional statute gov-
erning the approval of new drugs impliedly preempted the state’s
action.33  She ruled that a prohibition on the sale of an FDA-ap-
singles out for unfavorable treatment defendants that engage in commercial
speech” in a manner now forbidden by the Supreme Court).
28. See Rutkow et al., supra note 21, at 241 tbl.1 (listing only Georgia and
Kentucky as also using definitions tied to advertising).
29. See Matthew Perrone, FDA Unexpectedly OK’s New Hydrocodone Op-
tion, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2013, at B5.
30. See Bradley J. Fikes, Massachusetts Bans Painkiller Zohydro ER; Zogenix
Takes Issue with Action, Which Applies to All Pure-Hydrocodone Drugs, SAN DI-
EGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 29, 2014, at C1; see also Jon Kamp, New Painkiller Sparks
Abuse Concern, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2014, at A3 (“Lawmakers in Ohio and New
York recently proposed measures that would effectively ban Zohydro by classify-
ing it as a drug akin to heroin or LSD.”).
31. See Travis Andersen, Patrick Asks Ban on Drug Be Upheld; but Painkiller
Zohydro Was Approved by FDA, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2014, at B2; Brady Den-
nis, U.S. Judge Set to Rule on Drug Firm’s Suit Against Massachusetts over Pain-
killer Ban, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2014, at A4.
32. See Brady Dennis, Judge Voids Ban on Painkiller in Mass., WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 2014, at A3; Milton J. Valencia, US Judge Blocks State Ban on Opiate;
Critics Say Zohydro Could Be Misused, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2014, at B1.
33. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D.
Mass. Apr. 15, 2014).  The court declined to reach the plaintiff’s other constitu-
tional arguments. See id. at *2 n.2.  The objection premised on the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine seemed at least slightly misplaced because, as it turned out,
the financial consequences of Commonwealth’s prohibition would have fallen most
heavily on an in-state company. See Yvonne Abraham, Fighting, Then Fueling,
Drug Abuse, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2014, at A1 (“Out front in all of this contro-
versy has been a company called Zogenix, out of San Diego.  But Zogenix has only
a license to market the drug.  The actual outfit behind Zohydro is a Waltham com-
pany named Alkermes . . . .  Zogenix markets the drug and takes heat from critics,
but Alkermes owns Zohydro, manufactures it, and stands to make mountains of
money from it.”).  Moreover, the emergency regulation applied to all extended-
release pure hydrocodone products that lacked abuse-resistant features, whether
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proved product in a particular state probably would frustrate ac-
complishment of federal purposes, which she understood as
“mak[ing] drugs available to promote . . . the public health.”34  As I
have explained previously, the court’s “obstacle” preemption analy-
sis made absolutely no sense.35  Nonetheless, if Judge Zobel had
instead assessed the apparent conflict between state and federal law
using the U.S. Supreme Court’s newly expansive approach to the
“impossibility” prong of conflict preemption,36 then she undoubt-
edly would have reached the same conclusion.
sold by a local or foreign manufacturer, though Zogenix objected that (at least
initially) only Zohydro fell into this narrowly defined class.  Nothing, however,
suggested that this public health regulation served merely as a pretext to favor
local interests.  In contrast, imagine that Connecticut (home of the companies’
chief rival Purdue Pharma) had taken a similar step.  For more on the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine in this context, see Noah, supra note 4, at 35–42.
34. Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (“The FDA endorsed Zohydro ER’s
safety and effectiveness when it approved the drug. . . .  If the Commonwealth
were able to countermand the FDA’s determinations and substitute its own re-
quirements, it would undermine the FDA’s ability to make drugs available to pro-
mote and protect the public health.”).  Judge Zobel never suggested finding
implied conflict preemption premised instead on an impossibility of dual compli-
ance, and she distinguished cases that had rejected an implied preemption defense
to inadequate warning claims in tort litigation: “Here, the obstruction is clearer
because the drug Massachusetts wants Zogenix to adopt—Zohydro ER with an
‘abuse-resistant formulation’—has not been approved . . . .  Zogenix would be re-
quired to return to the FDA and seek approval of a drug different from the one the
FDA has already deemed safe.” Id.  Whether  or not this purpose animates the
FDA’s organic statute, Judge Zobel correctly considered issues of access for legiti-
mate patients in assessing the other factors relevant to deciding whether to grant
preliminary relief. See id. (“As to the equities, although the ban may prevent
someone from misusing the drug, the ban prevents all in need of its special attrib-
utes from receiving the pain relief Zohydro ER offers.  For the same reason, the
injunction is in the public interest.”).
35. See Noah, supra note 4, at 8–12.
36. See id. at 27–35; see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 490–93
(2013) (holding that FDA restrictions on the labeling of generic drugs made com-
pliance with additional state requirements impossible); cf. Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679–80 (2019) (holding that judges rather than
jurors should decide whether a company had offered clear evidence that the FDA
would have rejected an enhanced warning statement).  Contrast the FDA’s contro-
versial recent decision to approve Dsuvia® (sufentanil), which far surpasses
fentanyl in potency but apparently happened at the behest of the U.S. military.
See Lenny Bernstein, Stronger Than Fentanyl, Opioid Gets FDA Approval, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 2018, at A3.  In light of this federal interest, any state effort to re-
strict its use might well raise obstacle preemption objections.  Similarly, because
the FDA imposed stringent access restrictions under its risk evaluation and mitiga-
tion strategy (REMS) authority when it approved Dsuvia, see Noah, supra note 1,
at 780 & n.109, the sponsor would not enjoy the power to unilaterally modify its
labeling.  Indeed, now that the FDA has imposed REMS requirements on most
opioids, see id. at 781–83, conflict preemption might operate more strongly than it
does for other brand-name drugs. Cf. Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federal-
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Rather than continue litigating the case, officials in Massachu-
setts decided to issue new rules that focused instead on the behav-
ior of medical professionals licensed by the state: before prescribing
Zohydro, physicians would, among others things, have to check pa-
tient records for any evidence of substance abuse, and they then
would have to prepare a letter of medical necessity—attesting, for
instance, that other pain management treatments had failed—with-
out which pharmacists could not dispense the drug.37  In an
amended complaint, Zogenix characterized these new rules as
amounting to “a de facto prohibition,” and the federal district court
found even some of these more limited restrictions problematic.38
Judge Zobel explained that the letter of medical necessity re-
quirement suffered from various ambiguities and could mean that,
contrary to the labeling approved by the FDA, physicians should
use Zohydro only as a last resort.39  Finding a probability of implied
preemption because such an interpretation would frustrate the fed-
eral decision to make this drug available for health professionals to
use whenever they deemed it appropriate, she preliminarily en-
joined enforcement of this rule pending clarification from the de-
fendants.40  Judge Zobel also, however, summarily rejected an
equal protection claim asserted by Zogenix, which had alleged that
the defendants lacked any rational basis for singling out their drug
from all of the other long-acting opioids.41  Less than two months
ism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 874–75 (2017) (focusing, however, on the obstacle rather than
impossibility prong of conflict preemption in making this point).
37. See Milton J. Valencia, State Limits Use of Potent Painkiller; Addiction
Concerns Raised on Zohydro, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2014, at B1; see also Zettler,
supra note 36, at 873 & n.189 (elaborating on the practice restrictions imposed in
Massachusetts, and noting that Vermont had promulgated similar rules).
38. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at
*3–5 (D. Mass. July 8, 2014), vacated in part, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28,
2014).
39. See id. at *4.
40. See id. at *5.  Strangely, apart from finding a probability of success on the
merits, Judge Zobel said nothing about the other three prerequisites for granting
preliminary relief even though her brief discussion of these factors when initially
enjoining the outright prohibition would hardly apply with equal force to the pre-
scribing restrictions.  As for the company’s challenge to a related state rule that
allowed only licensed pharmacists to handle Zohydro (thereby barring pharmacy
technicians or interns from doing so), she found insufficient evidence to justify a
preliminary injunction on grounds of preemption. See id. (concluding that Zogenix
had failed to “provide sufficient detail that pharmacies will not carry Zohydro”).
41. See id. at *2 n.3 (explaining that the Supreme Court has reserved “class-
of-one” equal protection claims for situations where clear standards exist against
which to measure individual departures made by regulatory classifications rather
than discretionary judgments that depend on particularized assessments).  Judge
Zobel also again declined to reach the plaintiff’s Contract Clause and dormant
Commerce Clause objections. See id. (calling these “undeveloped arguments”);
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later, after the defendants issued revised rules clarifying what
should appear in the medical necessity letter, she vacated her previ-
ous order: instead of having to declare that other pain management
options had “failed,” now physicians simply would have to refer to
the “inadequa[cy]” of alternatives for a particular patient, which es-
sentially mimicked the FDA-approved labeling and therefore
avoided implied preemption.42
Even more so than her preemption analysis when preliminarily
enjoining the outright ban, Judge Zobel offered a questionable ex-
planation of how the prescribing and dispensing restrictions might
conflict with federal law.  She properly conceded that uncertainty
about how state officials might interpret these rules made it difficult
to discern whether they genuinely would frustrate federal pur-
poses.43  Even absent such contingency, however (in short, let us
assume that Massachusetts unmistakably had narrowed the circum-
stances of use or otherwise imposed conditions on prescribing
above and beyond those of federal law), the restrictions on use
would not create nearly the same conflict as had the original blan-
ket prohibition.
No doubt, as Judge Zobel explained, a tradition of state regula-
tion of the medical profession does not exclude the possibility of
see also Zogenix, Inc. v. Baker, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2015 WL 1206354, at *4–8 (D.
Mass. Mar. 17, 2015) (declining to dismiss the plaintiff’s third amended complaint
insofar as it again claimed implied preemption of the pharmacist-only handling
restrictions, but granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the equal protection,
Contract Clause, and dormant Commerce Clause objections to that rule).  Even if
Zogenix lacked a valid equal protection objection, the state’s decision to single out
this product might buttress substantive due process claims asserted by patients.
See infra note 111 and accompanying text; cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
447–55 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that had prohibited the distribu-
tion of contraceptives only to unmarried individuals as irrational under the Equal
Protection Clause).
42. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251, at
*2–3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2014).  The Massachusetts regulation applicable solely to
the use of single ingredient extended-release hydrocodone products lacking abuse-
deterrent features (i.e., Zohydro) also requires that physicians query the state’s
PDMP, discuss risks and benefits with patients, and enter into treatment agree-
ments that address issues such as drug screening. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS.
2.07(25) (2019).  It seems odd that officials chose not to apply such requirements to
all Schedule II opioids, but the differential treatment plainly would discourage
ever selecting this particular drug for a patient, so perhaps it continued to operate
as a de facto prohibition even after the state watered down the language governing
medical necessity letters. Cf. Christopher M. Jones et al., Addressing Prescription
Opioid Overdose: Data Support a Comprehensive Policy Approach, 312 JAMA
1733, 1734 (2014) (critiquing the state’s rules for “[s]ingling out” Zohydro in this
fashion).
43. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at *5
(D. Mass. July 8, 2014).
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preemptive federal involvement in the field.44  She failed to recog-
nize, however, that Congress repeatedly had offered assurances that
the FDA’s authority to license therapeutic products would not in-
terfere with the practice of medicine.45  Such legislative guidance
seemingly renders obstacle preemption inapt,46 unless, of course, a
state rule purporting to regulate prescribing or dispensing in fact
represented a veiled prohibition on use of an approved product.47
In spite of its setbacks in the litigation, the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Public Health could find some solace in the fact that the
FDA subsequently approved abuse-resistant versions of the drug.48
D. Capping the Number and Strength of Pills Dispensed
The opioid crisis emerged at least in part from irresponsible
prescribing by physicians.49  Of course, the medical staff affiliated
44. See id. at *4.
45. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the
Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 166–67 n.74, 173 (2004); see also id.
at 155 (“Congress repeatedly has announced its intention that federal officials take
care not to interfere with the practice of medicine.”); id. at 171, 175–76, 180, 191
n.179 (explaining that the FDA and the DEA defer to state decisions about who
enjoys prescribing privileges).  That article addressed the flipside of the problem
considered here—namely, asking whether the Constitution might bar restrictive
federal decisions in connection with therapeutic product licensure for posing an
affront to state primacy in regulating health professionals.
46. See id. at 166 (“[C]ourts have cited this provision [appearing in the Medi-
care statute] as evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws related
to the delivery of health care services to the elderly or the disabled.”); cf. id. at
167–68 (conceding that the inclusion of a “savings” clause would have done so
more clearly).
47. Cf. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627, 636 (2013) (“A State may
not evade the pre-emptive force of federal law by resorting to creative statutory
interpretation or description at odds with the statute’s intended operation and
effect.”).
48. See Bradley J. Fikes, Painkiller Unit Sold for $100M Upfront; San Diego-
Based Zogenix to Use Proceeds for Other Drug Trials, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 11, 2015, at C1; see also Lisa Girion, Powerful Painkiller Approved, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A8 (reporting that Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of
OxyContin® (extended-release oxycodone), had secured FDA approval for its
abuse-resistant extended-release hydrocodone product Hysingla ER®).
49. See Michael L. Barnett et al., Opioid-Prescribing Patterns of Emergency
Physicians and Risk of Long-Term Use, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 663, 664 (2017) (“It
is frequently argued that the prescribing behavior of physicians has been a driver
of the opioid epidemic.”); Gillian A. Beauchamp et al., Moving Beyond Misuse
and Diversion: The Urgent Need to Consider the Role of Iatrogenic Addiction in the
Current Opioid Epidemic, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2023, 2023 (2014) (“[A] similar
phenomenon occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when opioids were
prescribed liberally and indiscriminately for all types of pain.”); Jones et al., supra
note 42, at 1734 (“[S]tudies have identified inappropriate opioid prescribing—gen-
erally by a small percentage of prescribing clinicians—as a major contributor to the
increase in morbidity and mortality.”).
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with pill mills must have known that they had become nothing bet-
ter than drug dealers serving recreational users and other individu-
als already suffering from opioid use disorder.  One can trace the
wave of new addicts, however, to law-abiding physicians struggling
to treat serious pain in legitimate patients but engaging in some-
times inexplicable patterns of prescribing.50
In 2016, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) issued guidelines to address opioid prescribing.51  Among
other things, the agency urged primary care physicians to use these
narcotics sparingly, recommending instead the selection of non-
opioid analgesics and non-drug modalities such as physical therapy;
it also called for limiting first-time prescriptions for acute pain to
seven days as well as a maximum daily dose of 90 milligram mor-
phine equivalents (MMEs) for chronic pain patients on long-term
prescriptions.52  The CDC’s effort appears to have had an impact,53
in part thanks to state decisions to codify parts of these guidelines.54
50. See Noah, supra note 1, at 759, 762–64.
51. See Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 315 JAMA 1624 (2016).
52. See id. at 1638 box 5; see also Thomas R. Frieden & Debra Houry, Reduc-
ing the Risks of Relief—The CDC Opioid-Prescribing Guideline, 374 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1501, 1503 (2016) (“When prescribing opioids, the rule of thumb is to ‘start
low and go slow.’”); id. (“Overall, 1 of every 550 patients started on opioid therapy
died of opioid-related causes a median of 2.6 years after the first opioid prescrip-
tion . . . .  We know of no other medication routinely used for a nonfatal condition
that kills patients so frequently.”).  An affiliated entity, the U.S. Preventive Health
Services Task Force, recently issued proposed recommendations that call upon pri-
mary care physicians to routinely ask their patients about illicit drug use. See Jan
Hoffman, Task Force Advises That All Adult Patients Be Screened for Drug Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2019, at A19.
53. See Amy S.B. Bohnert et al., Opioid Prescribing in the United States
Before and After the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 2016 Opioid
Guideline, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 367, 374 (2018); cf. Wenjia Zhu et al.,
Initial Opioid Prescriptions Among U.S. Commercially Insured Patients,
2012–2017, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1043, 1047 (2019) (“Notably, these downward
trends began long before the release of the CDC guidelines in March 2016 (or
even the draft guidelines in December 2015), indicating that the CDC guidelines
were not the sole precipitating force behind the declines . . . .”); Joel Achenbach et
al., An Onslaught of Pills, Hundreds of Thousands of Deaths: Who Is Accounta-
ble?, WASH. POST, July 21, 2019, at A1 (“Prescription opioid overdoses have
claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people in the United States since 1996.  A
crackdown on indiscriminate doctors and pharmacists—commonly known as pill
mills—as well as tighter prescription guidelines by the medical community have
helped drive down the number of overdoses due to prescription drugs.”).
54. See Allison Petersen et al., State Legislative Responses to the Opioid Crisis:
Leading Examples, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb. 2018, at 30, 35 (“Several states
have utilized the CDC’s Guidelines as a model for their own efforts to battle the
problem.”).  Such guidelines may, of course, influence practice patterns through
other less direct routes: health insurers have used them to justify restrictions on
reimbursement, and they may help to define the standard of appropriate care for
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-3\DIK303.txt unknown Seq: 15 21-MAY-20 14:07
2020] STATE REGULATORY RESPONSES 647
Two years after its failed initial effort to block the use of
Zohydro, Massachusetts imposed restrictions on the prescribing of
essentially all opioid analgesics.55  Inspired by the CDC’s guide-
lines, the Commonwealth decided to limit the duration of initial
prescriptions to seven days.56  Since then, approximately two-thirds
of the states in this country have imposed opioid prescribing limita-
tions of some sort.57  Initial prescriptions—at least for acute pain—
may range from as little as three days in a few states to as much as
two weeks in others.58  Eight of these jurisdictions impose tighter
purposes of state disciplinary board proceedings as well as medical malpractice
litigation. See John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines,
15 J. LEGAL MED. 421, 422–23 (1994); id. at 442–43 (“Third-party users including
courts, insurers, regulators, and policy makers should recognize the tenuous nature
of parameter development and the substantial tensions tied to competing interests
as these guidelines are constructed.”); Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Map-
ping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 416–29, 462–63 (2002) (discussing guideline development and
use in malpractice litigation).
55. See Parker et al., supra note 6, at 369 (“Massachusetts . . . set a seven day
policy for new prescriptions, which has become the most common benchmark na-
tionwide . . . .”); see also id. at 376 (calling these laws “low-cost options . . . in-
volv[ing] only legislation and a minimal amount of implementation or regulation”).
Although frequently credited as the first state to take this step, one set of research-
ers noted that Iowa and Vermont had done so before 2012. See Ellen Meara et al.,
State Legal Restrictions and Prescription-Opioid Use Among Disabled Adults, 375
NEW ENG. J. MED. 44, 48 (2016).
56. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 19D(a) (2019); see also id. § 19D(b)
(specifying the circumstances that would allow prescribers to deviate from this re-
striction).  Three years later, however, Massachusetts had witnessed fairly disap-
pointing results. See Felice J. Freyer, State Progress on Opioids Uneven, BOS.
GLOBE,  May 16, 2019, at B1 (reporting only slight declines in overdose deaths to
that point).
57. See NCSL, Prescribing Policies: States Confront Opioid Overdose Epi-
demic (Oct. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/37Sv7EI [https://perma.cc/5K7P-8DH7] (“[A]t
least 33 states have enacted legislation related to opioid prescription limits.”)
[hereinafter “NCLS Prescribing Policies (Oct. 2018 compilation)”]; see also id.
(“Rather than setting opioid prescription limits in statute, a few state laws direct or
authorize other entities to do so (such as New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin).  These entities may include the de-
partment of health/state health official, or provider regulatory boards . . . .”); id.
(under the “Table: Legislation” tab) (detailing the laws enacted in each state as of
April 4, 2018); Corey S. Davis et al., Laws Limiting the Prescribing or Dispensing
of Opioids for Acute Pain in the United States: A National Systematic Legal Review,
194 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 166, 169–70 (2019).  Perhaps as importantly,
some states repealed their intractable pain treatment acts, which had created safe
harbors for health care professionals when prescribing opioids. See Dineen, supra
note 3, at 56; McPheeters & Bratton, supra note 6, at 1311–12 (discussing the oper-
ation and fate of Tennessee’s statute).
58. See NCLS Prescribing Policies (Oct. 2018 compilation), supra note 57
(under the “State Action” tab) (“Most of this legislation limits first-time opioid
prescriptions to a certain number of days’ supply—seven days is most common,
though some laws set limits at three, five or 14 days.”); cf. id. (“Maryland’s law
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restrictions on opioid prescriptions for minors.59  Also taking a cue
from the CDC’s guidelines, a few states have capped maximum al-
lowable dosages,60 which effectively prohibits the use of any opioids
approved by the FDA for chronic pain patients if the individual
dosage sizes exceed such a daily maximum.
Although preliminary research credits these restrictions with
reductions in opioid overuse and addiction,61 some physician
requires providers to prescribe the lowest effective dose of an opioid for a quantity
that is not greater than that needed for the expected duration of pain.”).
Oklahoma recently adopted a seven-day prescribing limit for adults with acute
pain that also required selection of the lowest effective dose of an immediate-re-
lease version. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-309i(A) (2019).
59. See NCLS Prescribing Policies (Oct. 2018 compilation), supra note 57
(under the “State Action” tab)  (“Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and West Virginia also set limits specifically for
minors.  These laws set limits for any opioid prescription (versus [only] the initial
opioid prescription for adults) and may also specify other requirements, such as
discussing opioid risks with the minor and parent or guardian.”).
60. See id. (“In a few cases, states also set dosage limits . . . .”); id. (under the
“Table: Legislation” tab) (showing daily dosage caps of 30 MMEs in Rhode Island;
90 MMEs in Arizona and Nevada; and 100 MMEs in Maine); see also 2019 Tenn.
Pub. Acts ch. 124, § 8 (codified at TENN. CODE § 63-1-164(b)) (“[A] healthcare
practitioner shall not treat a patient with more than a three-day supply of an
opioid and shall not treat a patient with an opioid dosage that exceeds a total of
one hundred eighty (180) morphine milligram equivalent dose.”); Sara E. Heins,
Morphine Equivalent Daily Dose (MEDD) Policies (June 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2VooPu2 [https://perma.cc/K7JD-65KA] (under the “Profiles” tab).  One state ac-
ted years before the CDC issued its guidelines. See Barry Meier, Tightening the
Lid on Pain Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012, at A1 (reporting that, in the
state of Washington, “lawmakers last year imposed new requirements on doctors
to refer patients taking high dosages of opioids [defined as 120 MME] . . . for
evaluation by a pain specialist if their underlying condition is not improving,” codi-
fying largely ignored guidelines that a state panel had issued four years earlier); see
also David N. Juurlink et al., Improving Opioid Prescribing: The New York City
Recommendations, 309 JAMA 879, 880 (2013) (discussing guidelines issued for city
emergency departments, comparing those used in Washington).
61. See Callie Ferguson, Maine Leads Nation in Decline of Prescription
Opioid Sales, Report Finds, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (ME), June 19, 2018, available
on LexisNexis (“Maine led the pack because it was one of several states to pass a
bill in 2016 aimed at curbing the amount of opioids that doctors can prescribe to
patients, the report [from Avalere Health] stated.  States that passed more aggres-
sive laws saw greater declines.”); Carolyn Y. Johnson, Opioid Prescriptions Fell
10% Last Year, Study Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2018, at A14 (“The volume of
prescription opioids given out by pharmacists has been decreasing since 2011, but
this was the most dramatic drop yet, as measured by the equivalent morphine dose
of all the opioids prescribed in a given year.  The trend suggests that public outrage
over the opioid epidemic and regulatory, legislative, clinical and commercial mea-
sures have begun to curb their use by physicians and patients.”); see also Steven B.
Porter et al., Letter, Association of Florida House Bill 21 with Postoperative Opioid
Prescribing for Acute Pain at a Single Institution, 155 JAMA SURGERY 263 (2020);
cf. Meara et al., supra note 55, at 47–49 (reviewing laws adopted between 2006 and
2012, including quantitative prescribing limits in two states, but finding no signifi-
cant impacts in the population studied); id. at 50 (“[L]egislative restrictions showed
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groups complained that the inflexibility of such policies has ad-
versely affected legitimate patients.62  In 2019, the CDC and the
FDA responded by issuing clarifications about the 2016 guidelines
and the prescribing information that accompanies particular prod-
ucts, cautioning physicians that abruptly cutting off—or too rapidly
tapering patients already taking high doses—might trigger with-
drawal symptoms and even suicide.63  Even if state legislators and
regulators take this caveat seriously, it will require some time
before existing mandates get revised accordingly.  If they fail to do
no measurable association with the percentage of [disabled Medicare] beneficiaries
filling prescriptions that yield high daily opioid doses or the percentage treated for
nonfatal prescription-opioid overdose.”); Parker et al., supra note 6, at 369 (“Be-
cause these policies were enacted quite recently, their effectiveness has not yet
been thoroughly examined.”).
62. See Jan Hoffman & Abby Goodnough, Rule Led to Big Drop in Opioid
Prescriptions; Too Big, Some Doctors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2019, at A16; see
also Daniel P. Alford, Opioid Prescribing for Chronic Pain—Achieving the Right
Balance Through Education, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 302 (2016) (“[S]uch blunt
approaches will also limit access to opioids for patients who are benefiting or may
potentially benefit from them. . . .  These regulations will lead some clinicians to
refuse to prescribe opioids even when they’re indicated, seeing it as too risky or
too much work.”); Kao-Ping Chua et al., Opioid Prescribing Limits for Acute Pain:
Potential Problems with Design and Implementation, 321 JAMA 643, 643 (2019)
(bemoaning “the failure of these limits to account for the heterogeneity in pre-
scribing and pain needs among individual patients”); Stefan G. Kertesz & Adam J.
Gordon, A Crisis of Opioids and the Limits of Prescription Control: United States,
114 ADDICTION 169, 172–73 (2018) (complaining about the “weaponization” of the
CDC’s guidelines); Parker et al., supra note 6, at 369 (“States have faced some
resistance from physicians’ groups in implementing these policies [limiting opioid
prescriptions].  Leaders of organizations including the American Medical Associa-
tion and the Maryland Society of Addiction Medicine have voiced opposition.”);
Zhu et al., supra note 53, at 1050 (“[L]arge numbers of providers have responded
to the opioid crisis by ceasing to prescribe opioids to patients who had not used
opioids, rather than prescribing opioids when indicated but at safer doses and
durations.”).
63. See Deborah Dowell et al., No Shortcuts to Safer Opioid Prescribing, 380
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2285, 2286–87 (2019); Abby Goodnough, Caution Urged in
Scaling Back Opioids, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2019, at A15; Sally Satel, Opinion, Pain
Patients Get Relief from Regulation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2019, at A17; see also
Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: A Taxonomy of Inappropriate Prescribing to
Shape Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 961,
961–68, 1001–10 (2019) (emphasizing the suicide risk); Deborah Dowell & Tamara
M. Haegerich, Editorial, Changing the Conversation About Opioid Tapering, 167
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 208, 208 (2017) (explaining that the CDC had not sup-
ported “involuntary or precipitous tapering”).
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so,64 however, then the previously discussed implied preemption ar-
guments might enjoy greater traction.65
E. Imposing a Surcharge on Opioid Sales in New York
In 2018, the New York legislature enacted the Opioid Steward-
ship Act.66  By imposing surcharges on the sale of opioids, the state
sought to collect $100 million annually.67  The statute prohibited
companies from passing these charges on to their customers
through price increases,68 though it failed to specify the territorial
reach of this prohibition.  Although the funds would also support
prevention efforts, including operation of the state’s PDMP, the law
sought primarily to fund treatment and other responses to opioid
addiction.69
Members of the industry promptly lodged various constitu-
tional objections to the statute.  A federal district court held that
64. Cf. Lev Facher, Painful Change; Oregon’s Plan to Cut off Coverage of
Opioid Painkillers for Some Medicaid Patients Is Prompting a National Debate,
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2018, at B9 (“State officials are considering a first-in-the-
nation proposal that would end coverage of opioids for many chronic pain patients
who . . . are enrolled in Oregon’s Medicaid program.  Over just 12 months, begin-
ning in 2020, they would see their opioid doses tapered to zero.”).
65. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text.  Separately, the DEA
adopted a rule more than a decade ago to allow limited circumvention of the statu-
tory prohibition on refills for Schedule II drugs by letting patients receive three 30-
day prescriptions at a single visit. See Issuance of Multiple Prescriptions for Sched-
ule II Controlled Substances, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,921, 64,930 (Nov. 19, 2007) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b)).  To the extent that it did so in order to facilitate patient
access, state laws that now impose greater restrictions arguably frustrate the pur-
poses of federal law (notwithstanding the CDC’s seemingly stricter advisory guide-
lines, which do not qualify as binding federal law).
66. See 2018 N.Y. Laws ch. 57, pt. NN; see also Sara Randazz, Opioid Compa-
nies Fight New Tax, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2018, at A2 (“More than a dozen other
states have considered some form of opioid tax in the 2018 legislative session, but
only New York’s has become a law, according to the National Conference of State
Legislatures.”).  Minnesota subsequently passed a similar law. See Torey van Oot,
Fees from Drugmakers Will Fund Opioid Fight, MINN. STAR TRIB. (MN), May 21,
2019, at 1A (reporting that the largest manufacturers of opioids initially would pay
more than $300,000 annually into a special fund to support prevention and treat-
ment programs).
67. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 3323(3) (McKinney 2019).  Manufactur-
ers and distributors would have their ratable shares calculated on the basis of mor-
phine milligram equivalents that they sold rather than as a percentage of sales
price. See id. § 3323(5).
68. See id. § 3323(2).  The law would sunset after six years. See 2018 N.Y.
Laws ch. 57, pt. NN, § 5.
69. See N.Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 97-aaaaa(4) (McKinney 2019).  After all,
by barring companies from passing along the charges to patients, the law could not
have reduced the use of these drugs by making them less affordable, though, given
the way that it calculated surcharges, it may have driven lower cost generic formu-
lations from the market.
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the pass-through prohibition ran afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.70  It recognized that the law, by making it prohibi-
tively expensive for generic drug manufacturers to continue selling
in New York, “could well reduce the availability of opioid medica-
tions for those who need them.”71  The decision prompted the state
legislature to replace the surcharge with an excise tax designed to
generate the same funds.72  Although patients with drug benefit
coverage typically would not show much sensitivity to changes in
prices, their health insurers often do,73 while other purchasers—
both legitimate and illegitimate—might turn to entirely illicit
opioids in the face of escalating prices for the FDA-approved pre-
scription products.74
70. See Healthcare Distrib. All. v. Zucker, 353 F. Supp. 3d 235, 261–63
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that it either had an impermissible extraterritorial
reach or, if the prohibition applied only to sales within the state of New York, it
would discriminate against out-of-state buyers, effectively forcing them to subsi-
dize benefits for residents of New York), app. pending (2d Cir.); see also id. at 265
(declining to reach the plaintiffs’ other constitutional objections).
71. Id. at 266.  Although OxyContin and other brand-name opioids attract
most of the attention, they account for only a tiny fraction of the opioids pre-
scribed in this country. See Aaron C. Davis et al., Makers of Generics Had Key
Role in Drug Crisis, Records Show, WASH. POST, July 28, 2019, at A1 (“[R]ecords
show that by 2006, as the death rate accelerated, a handful of obscure generic-drug
manufacturers were selling the bulk of opioid pills flooding the country.”).
72. See 2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 59, pt. XX (to be codified as N.Y. TAX LAW
§§ 497–499).  Separately, the attorney general of New York and other public enti-
ties have pursued lawsuits against the industry in hopes of securing sizeable settle-
ments that may get earmarked for similar purposes. See Roni Caryn Rabin,
Opioid Barons Stashed Assets, N.Y. Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2019, at A1;
see also Jan Hoffman, As Opioid Case Moves to Trial, Stage Is Set for a Landmark
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2019, at B2 (reporting that there are “now more than
2,300” public entity lawsuits, adding that the consolidated “federal opioid litigation
is being called the most complex in American legal history”).  As I have explained
in commenting to the press, this strikes me as unproductive (though potentially
lucrative!) scapegoating. See Harriet Ryan, Washington City Sues OxyContin
Drugmaker; Everett, Hit Hard by Opioid Addiction, Alleges That Purdue Pharma
Ignored Criminal Trafficking, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2017, at A1; Mitch Smith &
Monica Davey, With Overdoses on Rise, Cities and Counties Look for Someone to
Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2017, at A18 (“Critics say the litigation is a sideshow
in the opioid debate—a chance for lawyers to make money and politicians to make
headlines—rather than a lasting solution in the overwhelming crisis . . . .”).  In
other respects, however, the pending state and local litigation falls beyond the
scope of this article.
73. See Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Insurers Putting Cost over Safety
with Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2017, at A1 (reporting that drug benefit
plans prefer reimbursing for the use of cheaper drugs even if they pose a greater
risk of addiction).
74. Cf. Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank Your Orig-
inal License Beats Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 178
(2015) (noting that “price reductions for opioid analgesics might further expand
the black market” for diverted prescription products); Anna Wilde Mathews &
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F. Miscellaneous Other Prevention Strategies
A few states have mandated that prescribers enter into treat-
ment agreements with at least some of their pain patients,75 and
these contracts may call for periodic urine testing.  Normally, suspi-
cionless drug testing would confront serious constitutional
problems,76 but here it gets framed as a condition of access typically
implemented by private actors.77  Such laws seek to reduce the risk
of misuse either because the added burden created by such man-
dates makes health professionals hesitate or because the agree-
ments usefully engage patients in minimizing inappropriate use.78
In a related vein, at least ten states have called for co-prescribing of
the overdose reversal agent naloxone (e.g., the nasal spray Nar-
can®) whenever patients receive high doses of opioids,79 which at
Leila Abboud, FDA Approves Generic OxyContin; Teva, Endo Get Clearance Af-
ter Agreeing to Implement Abuse-Reduction Programs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004,
at A3 (“Law-enforcement officials have long been concerned about the potential
for a bigger, cheaper, less well-controlled supply once [generic] versions of Ox-
yContin are marketed by multiple companies.”).
75. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-707(a)(2) (West 2019); FLA. STAT.
§ 456.44(3)(c) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 18A(b) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 24:21-15.2(e)&(g) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-309i(E) (2019); see also
Michelle Andrews, When Patients Have to Sign “Pain Contracts,” WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 2011, at E4.
76. Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77–86 (2001) (holding
unconstitutional a public hospital’s program of disclosing to police urine test re-
sults of pregnant patients that had indicated prenatal cocaine exposure).
77. Cf. Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens
Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 234–36, 238 (2007) (discussing
requirements that patients undergo regular pregnancy testing and agree to other
steps if they wish to access prescription drugs known to cause serious birth de-
fects); id. at 252–54, 257–58 & n.104 (explaining the nature of the “unconstitutional
conditions” problem arguably posed by such programs).
78. See Joanna L. Starrels et al., Systematic Review: Treatment Agreements
and Urine Drug Testing to Reduce Opioid Misuse in Patients with Chronic Pain,
152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 712, 717–18 (2010); cf. Mark Collen, Opioid Drug
Contracts and Random Drug Testing for People with Chronic Pain—Think Twice,
37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 841, 844 (2009) (objecting that this approach amounts to
“heavy-handed medicine”); Daniel S. Goldberg & Ben Rich, Pharmacovigilance
and the Plight of Chronic Pain Patients: In Pursuit of a Realistic and Responsible
Ethic of Care, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 83, 102–22 (2014) (reviewing and critiquing
the use of opioid contracts).
79. See Christine Vestal, New Naloxone Laws in U.S. Seek to Stop Overdoses;
Doctors on Board with Initiatives, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (PA), May 5, 2019, at A4
(noting the recent passage of such laws in Arizona, California, Florida, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Washington); see also Terry
DeMio, Doctors Must Pitch Naloxone, CIN. ENQUIRER (OH), May 7, 2019, at A4
(reporting on a new rule from the State Medical Board of Ohio that requires a
discussion of naloxone with chronic pain patients when initially prescribing high-
dose opioids).
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the very least might help to underscore the seriousness of the risks
associated with the latter.80
States and localities have launched campaigns to educate
health care professionals as well as the public.81  A few states have
imposed specialized training requirements for anyone wishing to
prescribe opioids, mandating that they devote several hours to sub-
jects such as pain management and addiction.82  Other states have
added coverage of such topics to their generally applicable rules for
continuing medical education (CME).83  A few states also require
80. See Alexander Y. Walley, Editorial, Mainstreaming Naloxone Through
Coprescription to Patients Receiving Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain,
165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 292, 292 (2016) (“Receiving a naloxone rescue kit
may have served as tangible reinforcement of overdose prevention messages,
though this warrants further study.”); Vestal, supra note 79, at A4 (quoting Dr.
Andrew Kolodny, the director of Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, to
this effect); see also Ayres & Jalal, supra note 16, at 388 (“[T]he impact of other
opioid-related policies operates on prescriptions through more indirect channels
such as awareness amongst doctors of the extent, urgency and consequences of the
misuse and abuse of prescription opioids.”); id. at 398 (elaborating on this point).
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.30 (2019); see also Parker et al., supra note 6, at
370 (“At least 37 states have a public education campaign specific to the opioid
epidemic, and more are developing such programs.”); id. (“The evidence regarding
the effectiveness of antidrug education initiatives is mixed, at best.  Studies indi-
cate that many prevention campaigns do not have a significant impact.”).  One
interesting initiative, which had the local medical examiner’s office send letters to
prescribers when one of their patients died, apparently made an impression on
recipients. See Jason N. Doctor et al., Opioid Prescribing Decreases After Learning
of a Patient’s Fatal Overdose, 361 SCIENCE 588, 588–89 (2018); Margot Sanger-
Katz, Cheap Way to Fight Misuse of Drugs? Stern Letter to Doctor, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2018, at A20; see also Felice J. Freyer, Doctors Warned on Scripts; US
Attorney Cites Opioid Practices, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2018, at B1 (reporting simi-
lar initiatives taken by federal prosecutors in Massachusetts and Georgia, though
sending letters with a more accusatory tone).
82. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 94C, § 18(e) (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3309-a(3) (McKinney 2019) (requiring three hours of such training every
three years); OR. REV. STAT. § 413.590 (2019); N.M. CODE R. § 16.10.14.11(B)
(LexisNexis 2019) (requiring physicians with DEA registrations to take five hours
of CME on these subjects every three years); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 2190.5(a) (West 2019) (requiring it of essentially all physicians and surgeons);
Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Physician Continuing Education to Reduce Opioid
Misuse, Abuse, and Overdose: Many Opportunities, Few Requirements, 163 DRUG
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 100, 102–04 (2016) (surveying the range of require-
ments around the country); id. at 105 (“Physicians currently receive minimal, if
any, training on pain management, the proper prescribing of controlled substances,
and the identification and treatment of substance use disorder.”); NCLS Prescrib-
ing Policies (Oct. 2018 compilation), supra note 57 (under the “State Action” tab)
(“States have also created requirements for training or education for providers
related to opioids, such as training in prescribing controlled substances, pain man-
agement and identifying substance use disorders.”).
83. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-10b(b)(3)(B) (2019); see also Parker et
al., supra note 6, at 370 (“Only five states require that all physicians receive CME
on pain management.  Eight more apply such requirements to those licensed to
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that physicians disclose to their patients certain risks associated
with prescription opioids and recommendations for safe storage in
the home.84
Lastly, localities have promoted drug take-back programs—for
instance, by installing secure drop-boxes at police stations—in part
to get surplus opioids out of people’s medicine cabinets and guard
against the risk of diversion.85  One county in California obligated
manufacturers of any type of drug product to establish a program to
take back and safely dispose of unused supplies.86  In rejecting the
industry’s dormant Commerce Clause challenge, a federal appellate
court emphasized the relatively trivial financial burden imposed by
this ordinance: at most, it would cost little more than 0.1% of the
revenues generated by those companies in that county.87  In prac-
tice, however, these programs have hardly made a dent in our still
plentiful supply of prescription opioid products.88
prescribe or dispense controlled substances . . . .  This leaves a significant number
of states with minimal or no required pain management education.”).
84. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-473 (2019); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-3.18(q)
(2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-164(a)(4)(A) (2019) (also requiring that women
of child-bearing age receive information about neonatal abstinence syndrome);
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. Med. 501.02(i)(3)(A) (LexisNexis 2019).  Other states re-
quire disclosures only when prescribing opioids to minors under certain circum-
stances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 19D(a) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3719.061 (West 2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-363 (2019).  Still other states re-
quire that patients receive prominent written warnings upon dispensing by phar-
macists. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-42.5-121(3) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 329-39.5 (2019).
85. See Parker et al., supra note 6, at 371.  The DEA has promoted local ef-
forts to take back controlled substances. See Disposal of Controlled Substances,
79 Fed. Reg. 53,520, 53,567–69 (Sept. 9, 2014) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1317(B)).
In 2018, a pair of states mandated that the industry create such programs applica-
ble to all drugs. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 291 (McKinney 2019); WASH. REV.
CODE § 69.48.030 (2019).
86. See Abby Sewell, Firms Fight Drug Disposal Plan; The Industry Resists a
Proposal Requiring It to Pay to Collect Unused Medications, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2016, at B1 (reporting that other municipalities in the state had followed the lead
of Alameda County, adding that the ordinances aim to reduce contamination of
the water supply as well as the abuse of prescription drugs).
87. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Am. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037,
1045 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The county compares the cost of running the disposal pro-
gram ($530,000–$1,200,000 per year) to the manufacturers’ revenue-stream in Ala-
meda County (approximately $950 million per year) to conclude that the burden is
minimal.”); see also Bob Egelko, Top Court OKs Drug Disposal Measure; Firms
Must Bear Cost in Alameda County; County Can Make Manufacturers Pay for Dis-
carded Drugs, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2015, at D1 (explaining that other countries
have long imposed similar requirements).
88. See Kathleen L. Egan et al., From Dispensed to Disposed: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Disposal Programs Through a Comparison with Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program Data, 43 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 69, 74–75 (2017);
Parker et al., supra note 6, at 371 (concluding that “take-back programs are un-
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II. STEERING CLEAR OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OBSTACLES
Previous sections have touched on preemption under the
Supremacy Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as
potentially limiting state initiatives to combat the prescription
opioid crisis.  This Part considers other potential constitutional ob-
stacles—namely, those arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Putting aside its incorporation of First Amendment rights against
the states, which gives sellers possible commercial speech objec-
tions,89 the Fourteenth Amendment shifts the focus to the potential
rights of buyers.  Although many of the previously discussed initia-
tives would in no sense burden whatever fundamental rights pa-
tients enjoy, some of the more restrictive state laws might unduly
intrude on interests protected by the U.S. Constitution.
I could find only a single scholarly article that even hinted at
such possible constitutional objections to recent state initiatives re-
sponding to the prescription opioid crisis.90  Strangely, this group of
authors focused on the arguable rights that physicians enjoy as dis-
tinct from those of their patients, though they noted that these
would redound to the benefit of the latter group,91 and they repeat-
edly emphasized the “extremely unusual” nature of these govern-
mental restrictions on medical practice.92  Drawing on a decidedly
unrepresentative smattering of lower court decisions related to the
likely to significantly reduce the prescription opioid supply”); cf. Dineen, supra
note 3, at 74 (applauding even such admittedly “modest” efforts).
89. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing such objections
to aspects of Florida’s crackdown on pill mills).
90. See Nathan Guevremont et al., Physician Autonomy and the Opioid Cri-
sis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 203, 207–10 (2018) (discussing recent restrictions in five
states); see also id. at 207 (“The [opioid] prescription limits are unusual in that they
are binding and specific, contrasting with typical practice guidelines, which tend to
be general and advisory.”); id. at 208 (“[T]he [prescribing] guidelines are unusually
detailed and specific.”).  The three authors, all affiliated with the Yale Law School,
included a student (as the lead author), an adjunct instructor, and a research
fellow.
91. See id. at 215 (arguing that the restrictions work “at the expense of physi-
cian autonomy, whose goal, ultimately, is to allow the physician to assure the best
treatment of the individual patient”); id. at 216 (“[T]hese efforts could be more
narrowly tailored, impose less on the autonomy of physician decision-making, and
do less damage to those patients for whom opioid prescriptions are medically
indicated.”).
92. Id. at 210; see also id. at 203 (arguing that laws applicable to opioid use
“curtail physician autonomy to a greater degree than in almost any other area of
medical practice”); id. at 204 (“[I]t is one of the few areas in which legislatures
have interfered with physician self-regulation.”); id. (“[W]hen it comes to opioids
state legislatures increasingly have abandoned the historical norm of physician
self-regulation.”).
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use of abortifacient drugs,93 compelled physician speech, and re-
strictions on questioning patients about gun ownership,94 these au-
thors ultimately invoked the limited judicial recognition of
constitutional safeguards in this context only to buttress their
broader conclusion that policymakers should let the medical com-
munity get its own house in order rather than threaten the auton-
omy of physicians to use opioids as they see fit.95  Their half-
hearted constitutional analysis strikes me as weak,96 and I find even
less merit in their affiliated policy arguments.97  The sections that
follow will offer a more serious assessment of possible Fourteenth
Amendment objections.
93. For instance, the authors focused on a 2013 decision invalidating an
Oklahoma law that had prohibited the off-label use of the abortifacient drug
Mifeprex® (mifepristone) or the ulcer drug Cytotec® (misoprostol). See id. at 212
(discussing Cline v. Okla. Coalition Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 262 (Okla.
2013)).  In fact, that court had invalidated the law one year earlier, the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari but certified questions about statute’s coverage
back to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the cited opinion answered those questions
in a manner that then prompted the Court to dismiss certiorari as improvidently
granted, 571 U.S. 985 (2013).  The state legislature revisited the issue one year
later, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately invalidated that effort as well.
See infra note 136.  Apart from the authors’ failure to discuss the parts of this
convoluted history available to them at the time, they entirely failed to mention
that a pair of federal appellate courts already had held otherwise in reviewing chal-
lenges to similar  state laws. See Noah, supra note 4, at 18 n.69 (citing decisions
from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits).
94. See Guevremont et al., supra note 90, at 211–13; see also id. at 215 (“Con-
stitutional and statutory challenges may be available . . . .  Laws requiring physi-
cian speech in this context may find close analogues in similar laws in the abortion
context and raise First Amendment concerns.  Other potential sources of law may
be state and/or federal constitutional privacy doctrines . . . .”).
95. See id. at 214–16.
96. See Noah, supra note 45, at 158–71; see also id. at 168 (“Congress has
chosen to leave matters of medicine to the states, which in turn have chosen to
leave these matters largely to professional self-regulation.  Nothing in the Consti-
tution requires that doctors be given such a wide berth.”); id. at 193 (“[E]fforts to
protect patients by limiting the distribution of hazardous prescription drugs should
not founder on an exaggerated preoccupation with the rights of either states or
physicians.”).
97. See Noah, supra note 1, at 766–84; see also Noah, supra note 54, at 391–95,
402–06, 438–42 (discussing the difficulties that physicians encounter in accessing
and acting upon clinically relevant evidence); Gina Kolata, 10 Medical Myths That
Everyone Should Stop Believing, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2019, at D5 (“[R]esearchers
recently discovered that nearly 400 routine practices were flatly contradicted by
studies published in leading journals.  Of more than 3,000 studies [that they re-
viewed] . . . , more than one of 10 amounted to a ‘medical reversal’: a conclusion
opposite of what had been conventional wisdom among doctors.”).  In fact, the
medical profession has gotten a free pass from lawmakers for far too long, so the
crackdown on the irresponsible prescribing of opioids strikes me as a long overdue
come-uppance for physicians that might usefully usher in closer scrutiny of their
practices in other areas.
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A. Varied Aspects of Substantive Due Process
More than forty years ago, one early version of a PDMP got
assailed under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Whalen v. Roe,98
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process chal-
lenge to New York legislation that had required the use of triplicate
prescription forms (with a copy sent to state officials) for purposes
of monitoring the use of Schedule II drugs.99  The plaintiffs had
claimed, among other things, that the centralized reporting require-
ment would interfere with patients’ privacy-based rights to make
independent decisions about the use of drugs.100  The Court held
that the reporting mechanism imposed no serious burden on such
choices.101
In further explaining this decision, Justice Stevens remarked:
“Although the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of par-
ticular Schedule II drugs, it has not done so.  This case is therefore
unlike those in which the Court held that a total prohibition of cer-
tain conduct was an impermissible deprivation of liberty.”102  Does
this language suggest that a state could altogether bar access to a
drug without any particularly good reason, as implied by the first
sentence quoted above; or did the Court instead recognize that a
state might well have good reasons for doing so, as implied by read-
ing the second sentence quoted above as a limitation on the first
and in view of the fact that, by definition, Schedule II drugs carry a
high potential for abuse?103  Only rarely have courts or commenta-
tors referenced this passage from Whalen, much less tried to make
sense of it.104
98. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
99. See id. at 597–604.
100. See id. at 598–600.
101. See id. at 602–04; id. at 606 (“[T]his record does not establish an invasion
of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). But cf. Thorn-
burgh v. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766–68 (1986)
(crediting concerns that a state requirement for reports about abortion procedures
might chill patients who feared public disclosure of this sensitive information).
102. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 603 n.30 (“It is,
of course, well settled that the State has broad police powers in regulating the
administration of drugs by the health professions.”).
103. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution:
Reconciling Privacy and Public Health, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 29–30 n.149 (1989)
(“[T]his dictum appears to reflect a perception that the public interest behind such
a prohibition would be strong, rather than that the right to privacy would not be
implicated.”); see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592–93 (“Our concern is limited to
Schedule II which includes the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs.”).
104. See, e.g., Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841 n.7 (1st Cir. 1987); Lewis v.
Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Cal. 2017); State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d
698, 709 (Neb. 2013); Doe v. Axelrod, 527 N.Y.S.2d 385, 401 (App. Div. 1988);
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Two decades later, in its physician-assisted suicide decisions,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that either physi-
cians or patients enjoyed a fundamental right of access to
pharmaceuticals for uses not approved by the FDA.105  It seemed,
however, that five of the Justices would have recognized a right to
obtain medication for palliative purposes even if the use of such
drugs might hasten death,106 which at least suggests the possibility
of a comparable right of access for patients without a terminal ill-
ness if appropriate use of the drugs would not pose any risk of fatal-
ity.107  That possible extension aside, a slim majority at the time
evidently felt that terminally-ill patients enjoyed a fundamental
right of access to opioid analgesics.108
Margaret B. Hoppin, Note, Overly Intimate Surveillance: Why Emergent Public
Health Surveillance Programs Deserve Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1950, 1968 & n.89 (2012); see also B. Jessie Hill, The
Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doc-
trines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 304 (2007) (recognizing that “the Court’s statements
about outlawing certain drugs were pure dicta”); Note, Last Resorts and Funda-
mental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medi-
cal Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1996 n.61 (2005) (suggesting why “this
point should be treated with care”).
105. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (concluding that
the claimed right was neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); id. at 735 (holding that the state’s
prohibition survived review under the rational basis test); see also Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 800–01, 808–09 (1997) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a
New York statute that prohibited anyone from assisting suicide notwithstanding
the fact that another statute had authorized competent patients to decline resusci-
tation efforts); Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around?: Deactivating Implanted Car-
diac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1260–67 (2013) (discussing
these decisions and patient requests to discontinue the use of life-sustaining medi-
cal devices).
106. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (suggesting that the Court might hold it unconstitutional “were state law to
prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as
needed to avoid pain at the end of life”).
107. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Consti-
tutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495, 528 (2003) (“While [Justice
Breyer] does not explicitly state that barriers to adequate pain treatment in
nonterminal patients also would potentially represent a constitutional violation,
such a conclusion seems implicit in his reasoning.”); id. at 529 (“It seems logical to
imply from Justice Stevens’ argument that he would support a constitutional right
to pain treatment that does not hasten death for nonterminal pain.”); see also John
A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: Constitutional Issues in
the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 10 (“[T]he right to use
safe and effective medical treatments could also be grounded in liberty rights to be
free of pain or disability.”).
108. See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but
a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234–35
(1997); Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide
Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895, 908–09 (1998).  Subsequent decisions also reflect a
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B. Judging When Burdens Become Undue
The U.S. Supreme Court increasingly evaluates substantive
due process claims by asking whether a challenged state action
poses an “undue burden” to the exercise of a fundamental right.109
Certain state and local initiatives, such as public education cam-
paigns and drug take-back programs, obviously pose no burden on
continued access by legitimate patients, but these sorts of efforts
also seem likely to have little or no impact on the opioid crisis.  At
the other extreme, outright bans would erect substantial obstacles
to access, though the effort to do so in Massachusetts had targeted
only a single opioid product, which left any number of substitutes
available.110  For the most part, however, states have not taken dra-
conian steps such as banning individual drugs, preferring instead
more nuanced measures that focus on the behavior of prescribers
and dispensers.  Nonetheless, laws that single out opioids as a class
while ignoring similarly situated drugs (for instance, others listed in
Schedule II) arguably impose undue burdens on the rights of pa-
tients;111 minimum rationality tolerates underinclusiveness, but
heightened forms of scrutiny would demand some justification for
this differential treatment.112  In this respect, contrast PDMP
more flexible approach to recognizing fundamental rights. See Kenji Yoshino, A
New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015)
(calling the Court’s same-sex marriage decision “a game changer for substantive
due process jurisprudence”).  Although the membership of the Court has changed
in the meantime, which might herald a return to the grudging approach reflected in
Glucksberg, a willingness to find a constitutional right of access to palliative care at
least for the terminally-ill may survive.
109. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undue Burdens and Potential Opportunities in
Voting Rights and Abortion Law, 93 IND. L.J. 139, 145–51 (2018) (arguing that this
form of balancing has in practice come to resemble rational basis scrutiny); id. at
155–56 (adding that the Supreme Court’s latest abortion decision gave the test
more teeth); Mary Ziegler, Rethinking an Undue Burden: Whole Woman’s
Health’s New Approach to Fundamental Rights, 85 TENN. L. REV. 461, 488–502,
511–15 (2018) (same). But cf. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787,
805–15 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting a facial challenge to Louisiana’s admitting privi-
leges requirement applicable to both surgical and medication abortions), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (No. 18-1323 Oct. 4, 2019).
110. See Noah, supra note 4, at 58 (conceding that “Zohydro hardly qualifies
as a life-saving drug, and patients in severe pain would still have any number of
long-acting opioid analgesic substitutes available to them”); see also supra note 42
(noting the objection to singling out just one opioid).
111. Cf. Kate L. Fetrow, Note, Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Toward a
Holistic Undue Burden Jurisprudence, 70 STAN. L. REV. 319, 338–39, 343–44,
352–53, 356–59, 362 (2018) (arguing that the regulation of comparable medical
procedures should serve as the baseline for assessing the constitutionality of state-
enforced restrictions).
112. See Lars Noah, When Constitutional Tailoring Demands the Impossible:
Unrealistic Scrutiny of Agencies?, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1462, 1465–68 (2017).
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databases, which generally do not target only narcotic analgesics
even if the opioid crisis inspired more states to adopt more de-
manding requirements, with pill mill laws and prescribing restric-
tions, which single out these drugs.113
Most of the prescribing restrictions adopted by states sweep
across the entire range of FDA-approved narcotic analgesics, and
they have prompted objections about sacrificing the needs of those
for whom opioids may offer the only effective form of treatment for
their pain.114  As one physician put it: “Trying to correct prescrip-
tion drug abuse by targeting the number of prescriptions is similar
to trying to decrease automobile accidents by reducing the number
of cars; it may have some effect, but it will leave many walking.”115
Conversely, some of these laws apply only to acute pain,116 chronic
nonmalignant pain,117 or otherwise explicitly carve out palliative
113. See Dineen, supra note 63, at 974–75, 999–1001, 1005; id. at 996 (“State
prescribing laws and regulations singled out opioid prescribing for chronic pain,
while ignoring completely the palpable harms of other drug classes and practices
that left significant numbers of pills available for diversion.”); Guevremont et al.,
supra note 90, at 214 (objecting to “opioid exceptionalism,” pointing out that
“stimulants have not been widely singled out for prescription limitations”).
114. See Guevremont et al., supra note 90, at 207 (“Some physicians have
argued that such ‘hard limits’ [on opioid prescribing] prevent them from ade-
quately addressing individual patients’ needs.”); Joel Achenbach & Lenny Bern-
stein, Pain Patients Frustrated by a Crackdown, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2019, at A1;
Stephanie Armour, Opioid Curbs Face Patients’ Pushback, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27,
2018, at A3 (“Patient groups and health providers are increasingly challenging the
limits that have been placed on prescription opioids in the name of combating the
epidemic.”); Jan Hoffman, His Patients in Pain, a Doctor Must Limit Their Use of
Opioids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1; Terrence McCoy, “Unintended Conse-
quences,” WASH. POST, June 3, 2018, at A1 (“The correction has been so rapid, and
so excruciating for some patients, that a growing number of doctors, health experts
and patient advocates are expressing alarm . . . .”).
115. Frankie M. Griffin, Prescription Opioids in Arkansas: Finding Legislative
Balance, 68 ARK. L. REV. 913, 915 (2016); see also id. at 958 (elaborating); Kurt
Kroenke & Andrea Cheville, Management of Chronic Pain in the Aftermath of the
Opioid Backlash, 317 JAMA 2365, 2365 (2017) (“[M]any patients respond better
to one analgesic than another . . . .  Given the small analgesic effect on average of
most pain drugs, the few classes of analgesic options, and the frequent need for
combination therapy, eliminating any class of analgesics from the current menu is
undesirable.”); id. at 2366 (“Imperfect treatments do not justify therapeutic nihil-
ism.  A broad menu of partially effective treatment options maximizes the chances
of achieving at least partial amelioration of chronic pain.”); supra notes 3 & 62
(referencing other commentators who have lodged similar objections).
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 456.44(5)(a) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-
309i(A) (2019).
117. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 456.44(3)(c) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C,
§ 18A(b) (2019).  Genuine doubts exist about their comparative effectiveness in
these patients. See, e.g., Jason W. Busse et al., Opioids for Chronic Noncancer
Pain: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 320 JAMA 2448, 2456–57 (2018)
(reviewing studies done on the question, and concluding that opioids appeared to
offer no advantages over other drugs used in treating chronic pain).  The authors
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care for terminally-ill patients,118 which makes them better tailored
though still raises concerns about potentially chilling even plainly
defensible uses of opioids.
The freedom to make choices about medical interventions
seems to differ constitutionally from other purchasing decisions in
the marketplace of consumer goods and services.119  Lower courts
have rejected claims of a constitutional right of access to potentially
life-saving drugs not (yet) approved by the FDA,120 much less to
drugs not even undergoing clinical trials in the hopes of eventually
securing a license from the agency.121  What, however, about pa-
did conclude that, “[c]ompared with placebo, opioids were associated with . . .
small improvements in pain, physical functioning, and sleep quality.” Id. at 2456.
In other words, trial subjects treated with opioids reported doing only marginally
better (and in only some respects, though worse in others) than those subjects
given dummy pills!  Somewhat remarkably, one commentator recently touted this
review article as finding “small but statistically significant improvements in pain,
sleep quality, and physical function with the use of chronic opioid therapy (COT)
in some groups,” Dineen, supra note 63, at 970–71 (meaning what groups, pain
sufferers who otherwise would try to just tough it out?!), and she even complained
that “the media widely reported that the study showed that opioids do not help at
all,” id. at 971.  Let us not forget that the prescription opioid crisis emerged in part
because of misunderstandings about some flimsy findings that had appeared in the
published medical literature. See Noah, supra note 1, at 759 & n.13.
118. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-309i(H) (2019); TENN. CODE § 63-1-
164(e)(1) (2019); see also NCLS Prescribing Policies (Oct. 2018 compilation), supra
note 57 (under the “State Action” tab) (“Nearly half the states with limits specify
that they apply to treating acute pain, and most states set exceptions for chronic
pain treatment.  In addition to exceptions for chronic pain, most laws also exempt
treatment for cancer and palliative care from prescription limits.”).
119. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) (“Nor can it be said that any
individual has been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice
of his physician, to acquire and to use needed medication.”); Hill, supra note 104,
at 305–13, 329–32, 341–45 (discussing the Court’s treatment of autonomy in mak-
ing choices about medical care); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1827
(2007) (“[T]o impose a substantial burden on the patient’s right to protect her life
through medical procedures, the government should have to show that it has an
extremely powerful reason for burdening the right and that the burden is genu-
inely necessary because the government’s goals can’t be achieved in less burden-
some ways.” (footnote omitted)).
120. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es-
chenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701, 711–13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (investigational
drugs that have successfully completed Phase I trials for terminally-ill patients
without any other options); id. at 701 (“We do not address the broader question of
whether access to medicine might ever implicate fundamental rights.”);
CareToLive v. von Eschenbach, 525 F. Supp. 2d 952, 965–66 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (re-
jecting constitutional objections to the FDA’s delay in approving an active cellular
immunotherapy (Provenge®) for metastatic prostate cancer).
121. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (mari-
juana); Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (amygda-
lin); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) (same);
Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 123 (D.D.C. 2001) (marijuana).
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tients seeking access to a federally licensed narcotic analgesic for
approved uses in a state that has decided to restrict its use; would
that not substantially interfere with the rights of patients to make
sometimes profound or sensitive decisions about the course of their
medical care?
Two decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state
could not ban one of two recognized methods of late-term abortion
without including an exception when necessary to protect a
woman’s health,122 while only seven years later it decided that Con-
gress could do just that.123  Although such medical procedures do
not undergo any form of federal licensure,124 this pair of decisions
might help to explain what makes state restrictions on the use of an
FDA-approved opioid problematic.  If the agency has not approved
a particular analgesic (or it has withdrawn such an approval), then
generally no one in the country can secure access to it;125 if, how-
ever, the agency has issued a license but one state acts to disregard
it, then persons in that state (and only that state) cannot take ad-
vantage of an opioid even though it has received official sanction.
In short, upon FDA approval of a drug the baseline shifts from non-
availability to availability for pain patients, which a particular
state’s restrictions then would unsettle in a way that interfered with
their freedom to make potentially critical medical choices.
The act of federal licensure, even if not enough to trigger im-
plied preemption under the Supremacy Clause, seems to make the
122. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930–38 (2000); see also Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327–28, 331 (2006) (holding
that a state restriction on minors’ access to abortion required a health exception);
Hill, supra note 104, at 310, 319–20, 322–25 (finding a more limited recognition of
this exception in the Court’s subsequent rejection of a challenge to the federal
prohibition on late-term abortions); Volokh, supra note 119, at 1826 (“Postviability
abortions cannot be distinguished on the ground that they involve the woman’s
reproductive choice.  After viability, the time for that choice has passed, and the
right to get a therapeutic abortion is a consequence of the woman’s medical self-
defense right, not her abortion-as-choice right.”).  Commentators invoking the
health exception required by the Supreme Court for abortion restrictions do so in
order to claim a substantive due process right of terminally-ill patients without
other options to access investigational drugs; surely such a constitutional claim
more readily embraces a right of access to therapeutic products that already have
received FDA approval.
123. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161–67 (2007) (upholding the fed-
eral prohibition on “partial-birth” abortions even though it lacked a maternal
health exception).
124. See Noah, supra note 54, at 447–49.
125. Similarly, once Congress banned partial birth abortion, Nebraska pre-
sumably could resurrect its earlier prohibition (carrying more draconian penalties
than imposed under federal law) without running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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state’s burden of justification nearly impossible in the event that
some form of heightened scrutiny applies.126  Under what circum-
stances might a state have a substantial (much less a compelling)
interest in limiting access to a drug that the FDA approved?127 In-
deed, the FDA’s approval decision suggests that depriving legiti-
mate patients of access would represent something of a hardship to
them.128  On the other side of the constitutional ledger, serious
questions exist about the efficacy of the various initiatives that
states have taken in this area,129 which would not matter under the
126. Cf. Sarah Ricks, The New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of
Women, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 90–92, 99 (1989) (arguing that FDA approval
of the abortifacient mifepristone would make it impossible for individual states
seeking to prohibit use of the drug to invoke safety rationales if challenged as
burdening the right to privacy).
127. If courts could freely disregard the FDA’s risk-benefit judgment, then,
because prescription opioids invariably carry a risk of serious side effects, state
officials wanting to restrict access to a pharmaceutical product could simply point
to the risk labeling approved by the agency as the basis for asserting a safety ratio-
nale for their action.
128. Cf. Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 839, 855 (2009) (warning of “the twin dangers of tunnel-vision
(risk-utility judged solely from a [tort] plaintiff’s perspective) and preference ag-
gregation (risk-utility evaluated from a societal perspective), both of which might
unduly sacrifice the needs of a minority of patients for whom the risk-utility bal-
ance differs from either the particular victim or the norm” (footnote omitted)); id.
at 872–73 (illustrating with the infamous teratogen thalidomide).  Critics some-
times devalue pain relievers as nontherapeutic agents. See id. at 865 (“[A]re pow-
erful analgesics properly dismissed as merely ‘lifestyle’ drugs?  Contraceptives
sometimes get trivialized in this fashion.”); id. at 866 (“In the final analysis, all
drugs are, to one degree or another, lifestyle drugs.”).  If, however, some patients
could not tolerate any of the alternatives, see id. at 849 & n.39, 855–56 (explaining
the flaws in assuming therapeutic substitutability), then a state prohibition would
deprive them of access to palliative care in seeming contravention of the Supreme
Court’s guidance in the physician-assisted suicide cases, see supra note 107 and
accompanying text; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 934 (2000) (“A
rarely used treatment might be necessary to treat a rarely occurring disease that
could strike anyone—the State cannot prohibit a person from obtaining treatment
simply by pointing out that most people do not need it.”).
129. See, e.g., Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its So-
cial and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 183 (2018) (cau-
tioning that “an exclusive focus on opioid supply hampers effective responses”);
Haegerich et al., supra note 9, at 45 (concluding in 2014 that “overall the quality of
evidence for the effectiveness of the reviewed [prevention] strategies is low”); Al-
lison L. Pitt et al., Modeling Health Benefits and Harms of Public Policy Responses
to the US Opioid Epidemic, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1394, 1398 (2018) (“We
found that policies that expand addiction treatment or directly mitigate harmful
effects of addiction (e.g., overdose, infection) are immediately and uniformly bene-
ficial . . . .  Policies that reduce the prescription opioid supply may generate both
benefits and harms (at least in the short term) . . . .”); id. at 1399 (“[A]lthough our
base case analysis found that reduced chronic pain prescribing did not reduce ad-
diction-related deaths over 5 or 10 years, it reduces incidence of opioid addiction
and would eventually reduce deaths.”); see also supra note 16 and accompanying
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forgiving test of minimum rationality but becomes increasingly rele-
vant as one climbs the tiers of constitutional scrutiny.130
In 2000, the FDA approved the controversial abortifacient
drug mifepristone (Mifeprex®).131  Several states decided to im-
pose restrictions on use of this drug,132 which triggered challenges
in the courts.133  Insofar as these states simply mandated strict ad-
herence to the directions for use specified in the labeling approved
by the FDA, even though the agency itself does not do so,134 they at
least managed to avoid a direct confrontation with the federal li-
text (discussing research on PDMPs); supra note 22 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing research on pill mill laws); supra note 61 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing research on prescribing restrictions).
130. See FCC v. Beach Commn’cs, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (explaining
that only on minimum rationality review may a legislative choice “be based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”); Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2007); Roy G.
Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 310–11
(2015).
131. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepris-
tone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 571–90
(2001); see also Elizabeth Lawrence, Women Explore Online Options for Abortion,
USA TODAY, June 26, 2019, at 1A (“Medication abortion before eight weeks’ ges-
tation accounted for 24.6% of all abortions in the USA in 2015, according to the
latest figures from the [CDC].  The FDA said taking the combination of pills in the
first trimester has a success rate of 95% to 99%.”).
132. See Laurah J. Samuels, Note, Mifepristone Protocol Legislation—The
Anti-Choice Movement’s Disingenuous Method of Attack on the Reproductive
Rights of Women and How Courts Should Respond, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
316, 325–30 (2014) (discussing statutes from Arizona, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Texas).
133. See Noah, supra note 4, at 18–19 n.69 (citing split decisions among the
various lower federal courts and one state supreme court that have confronted the
issue, and noting that “[t]hese challenges claimed an undue burden on the abortion
decision but did not raise any preemption arguments”); cf. Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (invalidating restrictions in a Texas statute,
which required that abortion providers work in a facility on par with an ambula-
tory surgical center and have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, as undue
burdens); id. at 2315 (“The record makes clear that the surgical-center requirement
provides no benefit when complications arise in the context of an abortion pro-
duced through medication.”); supra note 109 (noting that the Court recently
granted certiorari to review a challenge to a similar statute in Louisiana).
134. See Marc Kaufman, Death After Abortion Pill Reignites Safety Debate;
Opponents Renew Drive to Ban Drug Woman Took, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at
A3; see also Eric A. Schaff et al., Vaginal Misoprostol Administered 1, 2, or 3 Days
After Mifepristone for Early Medical Abortion, 284 JAMA 1948, 1952 (2000) (“A
regimen that requires misoprostol to be given in an office setting 2 days after
mifepristone, followed by 4 hours of observation, . . . is unnecessarily restrictive
and creates scheduling and additional cost barriers to women.”); Sarah Lueck,
Groups Offer Abortion-Drug Variations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at B2. See
generally Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Stan-
dard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 397–99 (2002) (discuss-
ing the FDA’s recognition of the legitimacy of “off-label” use).
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censing decision.  After the agency revised the drug’s labeling in
order to facilitate readier access,135 however, states that continued
to bar any deviations from the now obsolete original directions for
use should fare poorly in the courts.136
To the extent that the prescription opioid epidemic came about
through irresponsible off-label use,137 states might consider impos-
ing restrictions on these Schedule II drugs similar to those tried
with mifepristone.138  Apart from sometimes narrow indications for
usage, however, the approved labeling for most opioids allows for a
fair amount of flexibility,139 but such a move would, for instance,
bar much of the growing and arguably inappropriate use in adoles-
135. See Sabrina Tavernise, New F.D.A. Rules Will Ease Access to Abortion
Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2016, at A1.  One day later, a state reacted by mandating
continued adherence to the now obsolete older protocol. See Erik Eckholm, Ari-
zona Governor Signs Abortion Bill That Skirts F.D.A. Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2016, at A8.
136. See Okla. Coalition Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 441 P.3d 1145, 1153–61
(Okla. 2019) (invalidating such a statute as posing an undue burden on the abor-
tion right).  If, however, the U.S. Supreme Court backpedals on women’s freedom
to terminate a pregnancy, then the Supremacy Clause may become an increasingly
important tool in the face of growing restrictions imposed by the states:
To the extent that recent Supreme Court cases have reinvigorated im-
plied preemption in cases where state law stands as an “obstacle” to the
achievement of federal purposes, one could argue that any state efforts to
prohibit or restrict distribution of mifepristone would create an impermis-
sible conflict with federal law.  After all, the Clinton administration ac-
tively encouraged the introduction of mifepristone in the U.S. market,
and it took some unprecedented steps to facilitate FDA approval.  It
would not necessarily matter that the new administration fails to share
the goals that inspired the agency’s earlier licensing decision.
Noah, supra note 131, at 601 (footnote omitted).
137. See Katie Thomas, Doubts Raised About Off-Label Use of a Painkiller,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at B1 (“The F.D.A. approved [sublingual fentanyl
spray] Subsys only for cancer patients who are already using round-the-clock
painkillers, and warned that it should be prescribed only by oncologists and pain
specialists.  But just 1 percent of prescriptions are written by oncologists . . . .
About half of the prescriptions were written by pain specialists, and a wide range
of doctors prescribed the rest, including general practice physicians, neurologists
and even dentists and podiatrists.”).  Apart from its narrowly drawn indications
statement, the approved labeling for Subsys also explicitly contraindicated most
other uses. See Stacey A. Tovino, Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids, 67 U. KAN. L. REV.
901, 909 (2019); see also Denise Grady, U.S. Warns of Dangers from Patch Used for
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at A10 (same for Duragesic® and other trans-
dermal fentanyl patches).
138. Cf. Noah, supra note 1, at 783 (recommending that Congress do so); id.
at 784 (conceding that “such a move would no doubt infuriate many physicians and
the powerful associations that represent their interests”).
139. See In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102, at *10 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 18, 2018) (explaining that, in response to a citizen petition filed by
Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing in 2012, “the FDA declined to rec-
ommend a daily maximum dose or the maximum duration of opioid treatment”).
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cent patients.140  Any patients thereby deprived of access to drugs
would have to surmount the fact that the FDA had not approved a
particular opioid for use in their condition,141 while those patients
for whom the agency decided that the benefits might justify the
risks would continue to enjoy relatively unfettered access.  In con-
trast, state laws that interfere with access to opioids by patients un-
mistakably contemplated in the labeled indications would unduly
burden their ability to exercise a fundamental right of access.
CONCLUSION
In order to prevent further overuse of prescription opioids,
states have adopted a variety of strategies.  Modest responses,
which should not raise any serious constitutional questions, include
physician education and patient disclosure requirements, public
awareness campaigns, excise taxes, and drug take-back programs.
More aggressive initiatives include mandatory queries of PDMPs by
prescribers and dispensers, restrictions on the operation of pain-
management clinics, prohibitions on the use of particularly hazard-
ous opioids, and limitations on prescription duration and dosage.
Although these seem to have a better chance of success, the over-
and underinclusiveness of such laws makes them vulnerable to sub-
stantive due process challenges.  In particular, if these regulatory
efforts put substantial obstacles in the way of terminally-ill patients
seeking palliative care, then states would face a difficult burden of
justification.  Chronic pain patients deprived of access to opioid
analgesics approved for sale by federal regulators also might have
valid constitutional objections to state laws that sweep too broadly,
140. See Joel D. Hudgins et al., Trends in Opioid Prescribing for Adolescents
and Young Adults in Ambulatory Care Settings, 143 PEDIATRICS e20181578, at 6
(2019) (“[A]dolescents and young adults are at high risk for opioid misuse and
abuse after exposure from medical treatment, and a number of studies indicate
that the opioid epidemic disproportionately affects young people.”); see also Nora
D. Volkow & A. Thomas McLellan, Opioid Abuse in Chronic Pain: Misconcep-
tions and Mitigation Strategies, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1257 (2016) (“[I]n
adolescents, the risks and benefits of prescribing opioids for pain management
need to be even more carefully weighed than in adults.”); Catherine Saint Louis,
F.D.A. Approval of OxyContin Use for Children Continues to Draw Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A20 (reporting that the agency allowed the addition of a
narrow indication for use in adolescents conditioned on the submission of
postmarket data on patterns of use).
141. In fact, growing restrictions on opioids have reportedly caused an in-
crease in the dangerous off-label use of non-narcotic drugs in some chronic pain
patients. See Sheila Kaplan, Curtailing Opioids, Not Back Pain, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2018, at D1 (discussing epidural injections of steroids such as Depo-Medrol®
(methylprednisone acetate)).
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especially to the extent that these efforts do not effectively reduce
the overdose rates.
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